ESSAY Clausewitz

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Is Clausewitzian thought really timeless as some have claimed? With reference to the war on terror. Pages: 1-18

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Is Clausewitzian thought really timeless as some have claimed? Discuss with reference to the war on terror. On September 20th, 2001, George W. Bush declared a ‘war on terror’ in his speech before the Joint Session of Congress, ‘that will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.’1 Only three weeks later a military campaign started in Afghanistan with the goal of capturing Al Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, and overthrowing the Taliban regime who were known to provide a safe haven for terrorists. 2 Renamed as ‘overseas contingency operations’ by the Obama administration3, the War on Terror continues to this day. So far, a great number of Al Qaeda leaders have been killed, the terrorists have been stripped of their finances and they have lost their main state supporter. However, from its outset, this ‘war’ is nothing like what Clauswitz would have witnessed while writing ‘On War’. Not only has it still not come to an end, but it has become a war that defines its successes not in terms of ‘what happens’ but in terms of ‘what does not happen’.4 It is no longer a conflict that is fought out on battlefields between soldiers of the states they are representing, it is rather a competition of ideas, a contest between ideologies. Hence, we must ask ourselves whether Clausewitz is still relevant. Could it be that we are fighting a war for which Clausewitz can no longer provide an analysis? What has changed? In this paper, I will argue that the conduct of war has changed, but not its logic. I suggest that globalization did change warfare in a way that Clausewitz did not forsee, however, the very nature of war, as he describes it, has not changed with regard to the War on Terror.

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Document: George W. Bush: Declaration of War on Terrorism -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia." Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . 2 Ibid. 3 "Obama Administration to End Use of Term 'war on Terror' | World News | Guardian.co.uk." Latest News, Sport and Comment from the Guardian | The Guardian. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . 4 Heng, Y.-K. "Unravelling the `War' on Terrorism: A Risk-Management Exercise in War Clothing?" Security Dialogue 33.2 (2002): 227-42. Print. 228

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Clausewitz and his War Environment versus the War Environment of Globalization In order to approach the question of whether Clausewitzian thought is timeless or not, we must look at the historic context in which Clausewitz constructed his theories on war. Carl von Clausewitz was a Prussian soldier during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. Clausewitz himself served during a time in which warfare underwent a significant change. Before 1789 warfare had only included relatively small armies of professional soldiers who were trained to conduct war in a way that had not changed much over the last century. Napoleon, however, employed huge armies which were constitued of most men the country had, not carrying out traditional tactics, but overwhelming by just their enourmous size.

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Despite this

change in warfare, the ability to wage war was still restricted to states and their rulers. Battles were fought on battlefields and state leaders could call a definitive beginning and end to a war. Armoury was restricted to soldiers employed by the state, communication was very much limited to letters and messangers and there was no weapon that could anhiliate the entire world population. In contrast, the War on Terror, with which we are concerned today, takes place in world that is very different from the time that Clausewitz stood on the battlefield. The conduct of war, ‘the formation and conduct of the fighting’6 as Clausewitz puts it, has changed significantly. I believe there are three main factors that transform today’s globalized war arena in a way that Clausewitz could not possibly have accounted for: (1) The emergence of nuclear weapons, (2) the power of the media and the henceforth mobilization of masses and (3) the involvement of amorphous networks in war rather than just states. Nuclear Weapons When Clausewitz notes: ‘The invention of gunpowder, the constant progress of improvements in the construction of firearms, are sufficient proofs that the tendency to destroy the adversary which lies at the bottom of the conception of war is in no way

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Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Ware: Wordsworth Classics, 1997. Print. Introduction. Ibid., 74.

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changed or modified through the progress of civilization’7, he realizes that while our civilization progresses we still try to improve the ways in which we can destroy our opponent, rather than putting down our arms altogether as one might think a civilised society would do. It seems ironic, that, just as Clausewitz predicted, our civilization today has progressed into a very sophisticated society, however we have also developed the ultimate weapon – a weapon that could anhiliate our very existence. The Nuclear age makes the absolute war possible, a war of extremes, which was as Clausewitz argued only possible ‘in the abstract’ 8. The constraints that Clausewitz put upon real war, such as the inability to bring the whole country into operation at once to create an instantaneous blow, diminish when nuclear weapons are used and an absolute war, which would ‘involve us in extremes’9 emerges. Mary Kaldor argues that since the realization that nuclear war would lead to the self-destruction of civilization, the notion of deterrence was developed, which allows wars to be fought in imagination but not in reality – Clausewitz did realize that such a war could only be fought in abstraction if the civilization was not to be destroyed, however he did not forsee that war could become something that would no longer be a tool to destroy the enemy, since in a nuclear war that is only possible through annihilation.

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John

Shephard J.R. supports this observation when he points out that ‘Nuclear weapons vastly reduce the limitations that moderate conventional warfare…They make ‘absolute war’, which Clausewitz considered only a theoretical paradigm, far more realizable.’11 The emergence of nuclear weapons also transforms terrorism. If a terrorist organization were able to acquire or develop such a weapon they would have the capacity to cause an amount of destruction that is so far limited to state actors. In the War on Terror this is a serious concern and influences they way in which states assess the danger posed by their opponent.12

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Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War . 7. Ibid., 9. 9 Ibid. 10 Kaldor, Mary. "Inconclusive Wars: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant in These Global Times?"Global Policy 1.3 (2010): 271-81. Print. 274. 11 Shephard, John JR. E. "On War: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant." US Army War College(1990): 85-99. Print. 12 Mulvey, Stephen. "BBC News - Could Terrorists Get Hold of a Nuclear Bomb?" BBC News - Home. Web. 19 Nov. 2011. 8

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Media Influence Another factor that makes the strategic environment in which the War on Terror is fought very different from any Clausewitzian war environment is the enormous media power. Clausewitz notes that ‘the passions which break forth in war must already have a latent existence in these peoples’13. Today these passions can develop within a matter of seconds, as happened on September 11th. Millions of people all over the world saw the event unfold before there eyes, because it was broadcast on every television channel. Rasmussen notes: ‘People all over the world watched the event that made it part of their experience of life…no matter how the events were interpreted, the reactions of so many people should have some kind of multiplying effect.’14 Across the continent people felt a huge outrage about the terrible crime that Al-Qaeda had comitted, especially in America. After what they saw as an attack on their country on their own soil, the public was crying out for justice and administration had no choice but to pursue the terrorists with military force. They ‘defined the attacks of 11 September 2001 as acts of war because of the response the administration believed to be required’ - Rasmussen.15 Donald Rumsfeld called the event a ‘vicious, well-coordinated, massive attack against the United States of America.’16 By broadcasting such immediate reactions of the administration the public was further encouraged in its outrage and there was no realistic alternative for the government than to start a military operation without being able to weigh out costs and benefits. Involvement of Amorphous Networks In our current strategic environment, war is often fought between two very unequal opponents. In the case of the War on Terror, we have the military superpower of the United States on one side and an amorphous terrorist network, consisting mainly of 13

Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. 26 Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby. "A New Kind of War: Strategic Culture and the War on Terrorism." IIS Working Paper 3 (2003): 2-21. Print. 4 15 Ibid., 6. 16 Natta, Don Van, and Lizette Alvarez. "A DAY OF TERROR - ATTACK ON MILITARY - A DAY OF TERROR - ATTACK ON MILITARY - A Hijacked Boeing 757 Slams Into the Pentagon, Halting the Government - NYTimes.com."The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. 12 Sept. 2001. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . 14

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Al-Qaeda, on the other side. Clausewitz was aware that a war could be fought between two sides of unequal military strength17, however in the Clausewitzian war paradigm there was no such thing as fighting a war against a ‘network’. For a military campaign to be successful Clausewitz identifies three steps. (1) Destroying its military power (‘reduced to such a state as not be able to prosecute the war’), (2) conquerng its country (‘must be conquered, for out of the country a new military force may be formed’) and (3) subduing its will (‘still the war…cannot be considered as at an end as long as the will of the enemy is not subdued also’).18 The War on Terror however, can no longer be fought by adhering to these steps as it is the will that becomes the main power of a network or insurgency. Territory and armoury still play a role, however they are significanlty inferior. A terrorist network, for example is able to exert their power even if their access to land and arms is very limited. It is the will that becomes the focus of attention, while actors in the Clausewitzian age could draw power from land and army, terrorist groups rely on the will of their supporters. Terrorist networks do not rely on militaries to exert their power, they fight by asymmetric means. Their power lies in the way they create fear in their enemies. They do not have countries that can be conquered, they can use any haven to develop their tactics. Due to this unpredictable character, we fight a preventive war on terror. Rather than fighting against a specific enemy at a specific point in time, as Clausewitz would have done, we are trying to destroy structures that could harm us in the future. With regard to the War on Terror Yee-Kuang Heng points out that ‘the rhetorical war on terror…avoids negative futures with no prospect of closure’ and a ‘successful blitz on terror is also defined by non-events like preventing terrorist attacks’19. This tendency of current wars to be no longer waged between two states posessing a military and country is not exclusive to the War on Terror. It is inherent in the present war environment; most wars are either wars against networks such as the Drug War or the War on Terror, or they are civil wars, which take place within the state.

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Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. 27 Ibid., 25-26. 19 Heng, Y.-K. "Unravelling the `War' on Terrorism: A Risk-Management Exercise in War Clothing?" 228. 18

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The ‘Wondrous Trinity’ in the War on Terror We have seen that the environment in which war takes place has changed and consequently has its conduct, however that does not automatically mean that Clausewitzian thought has become obsolete. Let us begin by looking at his ‘wondrous trinity’ (‘Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit’), which encompasses hatred and enmity (‘Hass und Feinschaft’), the play of probabilities and chance (‘Wahrscheinlichkeiten und Zufall’) and reason (‘blosser Verstand’). Clausewitz goes on to attribute the first of these tendencies to the people, the second to the general and its army and the third to the government.20 However, Clausewitz does not say that the formal elements of people, army and government are essential to war, rather he points out that the ‘three tendencies…are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject’.21 He merely attributes the tendencies to the elements of people, army and government, because those were the sructures prevalent in his time. Martin van Creveld, argues that the ‘Clausewitzian universe is rapidly becoming out of date and can no longer provide us with a proper framework for understanding war’.22 He also proposes that the trinitarian framework did not apply to any period before the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 either, since the artificial body of a state was only created thereafter.

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However, van Crefeld seems to oversee that Clausewitz’s

trinity consisted of tendencies – not of artificial components such as government, army and state. Van Crefeld states that the ‘present-day armed violence does not distinguish between governments, armies, and peoples’24, and he is right, they do not. If one interprets the trinity as the relation between the static elements of army, people and government, the War on Terror would certainly be deemed as ‘nontrinitarian’. Leaders, followers and fighters of the cause are all civilian; on the ‘terrorist side’ of the war one will not find a represetative government, only governments that may support the terrorists. There is no formal army, civilians are the victims of attacks, rather than just the military. If one were to interpret the trinity in this formal way, one

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Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. 24/ Von Clausewitz, Carl. Vom Kriege. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1980. Print. 42 21 Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. 24. 22 Van, Creveld Martin. The Transformation of War. New York: Free, 1991. Print. 58 23 Ibid., 49-57. 24 Ibid., 58.

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could call Clausewitz obsolete with regard to the War on Terror. However, as careful examination of the passage in which Clausewitz introduces his ‘wondrous trinity’ reveals, Clausewitz was concerned with tendencies and he only used the elements of people, army and government to show the reality of his trinity within the framework of his time.25 If we look beyond the structure of people, army and government and take the trinity for what it is, a composition of tendencies, we find that it remains a useful framework of analysis with regard to the War on Terror. We can substitute people, army and government for supporters, fighters and leaders, respectively, as suggested by John Stone.26 For example, the terrorist organization Al Qaeda has a network of leaders that control the operations of their fighters and plan the terrorist attacks. Al-Qaeda’s new leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri was appointed on the 16th of June 2011 after Osama bin Laden’s death.27 The organization has fighters that carry out the attacks, such as the members that highjacked the planes and flew them into the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001. The supporters are those who support the jihad (‘holy war’) waged by Al-Qaeda, they feel like Al-Qaeda gives them a voice. They are often ‘young, militant jihadists fed up with the West and their own governments’.

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often are very passionate about the cause, they are even willing to die for it. Making these slight modifications to adapt Clauswitz’s model to the ‘war on terror’ we can see very clearly that the trinity is still applicable. Hatred an enmity can be seen in the supporters who are frustrated with their situation and seek vengence, the play of probability and chance in the suicide fighters and reason in the leaders that run the operation. Clausewitz’s trinity of tendencies can also be identified on the ‘American’ or ‘Western’ side of the war. The passions can clearly be seen in the people that were so gravely affected by watching the events of September 11th. Even if these passions did not have a latent existense before, seeing this tragedy provoked a huge outrage in 25

Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. 24. Stone, John. "Clausewitz's Trinity and Contemporary Conflict." Civil Wars 9.3 (2007): 282-96. Print. 284. 27 "BBC News - Al-Qaeda's Remaining Leaders." BBC - Homepage. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . 28 Clarke, Richard A. "Bin Laden's Dead. Al Qaeda's Not." Nytimes.com. 2 May 2011. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . 26

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people not only in America, but all over the world. This outbreak of passions created an environment in which the decision to go to war was easy to justify and heavily supported by the people. To put it in John Stone’s words: ‘US anger at being attacked combined with fear about weapons of mass destruction generate a higly permissive domestic climate for war.’29 The element of reason can be found in the American government that subsequently decided defend themselves against, what they perceived as, organisations responsible for this terrorist attack. Furthermore, the American military, foreign troops and private contractors compromised an army that engaged in a ‘play of probabilities and chance’. Politics and Policy in the War on Terror One of Clausewitz’s most famous dictums is ‘war is a mere continuation of policy by other means’.30 If one looks at the German original, Clausewitz says ‘Der Krieg ist eine blosse Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln’.31 The German word Politik could mean either, politics or policy. If we define politics as ‘the activities associated with the governance of a country or area, especially the debate between parties having power’32 then for Al-Qaeda the jihad is a continuation of politics by other means. Van Creveld argues that the jihad is a continuation of religion, rather than a continuation of politics.

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The English

translation of jihad is ‘holy war’, however it seems that Al Qaeda is not fighting a religious war – religion merely justifies their actions. Just like the French revolutionary wars justified themselves by claiming the conquests were all made in the name of equality, citizenship and alienable rights. The terrorist organisation Al Qaeda (although Osama bin Laden never used the term before 9/11) springs from the islamist movement that rose with the Islamic Revlution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The movement’s primary objective was to topple the Soviet regime in Afghanistan. After the ‘evil empire’ was defeated most jihadist supporters wanted social and political change – Al Qaeda wanted to establish an islamic 29

Stone, John. "Clausewitz's Trinity and Contemporary Conflict." 289-290. Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. 22. 31 Von Clausewitz, Carl. Vom Kriege. 39. 32 "Oxford Dictionaries" Oxforddictionaries.com. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . 33 Van, Creveld Martin. The Transformation of War. 139. 30

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government, not only in Afghanistan, but in all Arab countries. However, the progress in the domestic campaigns to establish Islamic governments progressed slowly and Al Qaeda felt that they could not bring about change without challenging Western military power, economic strength and cultural influence since the West, led by the USA, was supporting Israel and the unrepresentative regimes of the Middle East.

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For Al Qaeda, the jihad is not a continuation of religion by other means – it is politics. They want to see the Arab region under the control of Islamic governments and they use religion to justify their war. Their aim is not to convert the Western world to Islam, the West is being attacked because they are hindering the establishment of islamic governments in the Middle East. If one defines policy as ‘a course or principle of action’35 the war on terror is a continuation of it, on either side. Clausewitz states that ‘the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible with these means [the means to conduct war]’. 36 For Al Qaeda their policy is compatible with their means; they once proclaimed the position that ‘Islamic governments have never been and will never be, established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been by pen and gun by word and bullet by tongue and teeth’.37 This claim can be compared to a policy statement issued by states. The organisation decides a course of action in order to achieve their goal, establishing islamic governments in the Arab world. They feel that peaceful means will not be enough to achieve their goal. In their jihad they do exaclty as proclaimed in this ‘policy statement’, they use physical and psychological violence to get their adversaries to submit to their will, such as taking hostages in order to get Western countries to withdraw their forces from the Middle East.38 Let us recall the definition of politics, ‘the activities associated with the governance of a country or area, especially the debate between parties having power’. A key factor

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Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia UP, 2002. Print. 3-5 35 "Oxford Dictionaries" Oxforddictionaries.com. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. 36 Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. 22. 37 Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. 5. 38 "Al-Qaeda Releases Video of French Hostages - Africa - Al Jazeera English." AJE - Al Jazeera English. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. .

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to the governance of one’s country is the ensurance of national security. Without defending oneself when under attack, it is impossible to maintain governance over one’s country. When the White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card spoke the words ‘America is under attack’ to President Bush after the second plane had hit the World Trade Center in Manhattan39 he identified the events as a most dangerous security threat, an attack. If we define attack as ‘taking aggressive military action against a place or enemy forces with weapons or armed force’ 40 a political actor would have no choice but to defend itself against this attack. After being ‘attacked’ as they called it, the American administration saw no other option than to continue their politics by other means – by fighting a war against the adversaries that had attacked them. The Americans felt as if they were losing effective governance of their own country because they were not able to control events such as the September 11th attacks. ‘War should be the politics of last resort’ -Colin Powell, former US secretary of state. The administration felt as if they were not able to secure the governance of their nation without destroying the one that was harbouring the terrorists that were threatening their security. The only way to fight the danger posed by their adversary, the terrorist network of Al-Qaeda, was to destroy the Taliban regime, remove its main area of training and to transform Afghanistan into a Western-orientated market economy state, closely allied to the United States.

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Therefore, not only is the jihad a

continuation of politics by other means, but so is the US War on Terror. The American foreign policy in response to the 9/11 attack was heavily influenced by the Bush Doctrine. In his speech at West Point he made clear that the policy to deal with the terrorist threat was one of prevention, no longer relying on deterrence and containment: ‘Yet the War on Terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action.’42 He set the course of action that would guide this war and so far, the means used in this 39

Yurdakul, Afsin. "He Told Bush That America Is under Attack." Msnbc.com - Breaking News, Science and Tech News, World News, US News, Local News- Msnbc.com. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . 40 "Oxford Dictionaries" Oxforddictionaries.com. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. 41 Rogers, Paul. Global Security and the War on Terror: Elite Power and the Illusion of Control. London: Routledge, 2008. Print. 194 42 Gurtov, Melvin. Superpower on Crusade: the Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006. Print. 39

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war have been compatible with this policy statement. The government uses military action in order to destroy the terrorist networks, they are offensive rather than defensive, hence it can be concluded that their war is also a continuation of policy. The Centre of Gravity in the War on Terror The ultimate goal of a war is victory – the act of defeating the enemy. Clausewitz proposes that one will only achieve victory if one manages to create a blow against the point where the greatest number of the enemy’s forces are collected together. He calls this part the ‘centre of gravity’. He adopts the concept of gravity from physics and notes: ‘As a centre of gravity is always situated where the greatest mass of matter is collected, and as a shock against the centre of gravity of a body always produces the greatest effect, and further, as the most effective blow is struck with the centre of gravity of the power used, so it is also in war.’43 Terrorist networks do not seem to have centres of gravity, therefore it is impossible to create a blow that will defeat them. They usually do not have a significant ‘mass of matter’ in the sense that they have a concentrated military force that is essential to their operations. The Clausewitzian concept of a centre of gravity, and the essential destruction thereof to achieve victory, seems to be eroding with regard to the War on Terror. 20 of Al Qaeda’s 30 top leaders have been killed44, the Taliban which provided the organisation with a safe haven have been defeated. However, it would be false to claim that Al Qaeda has ceased to exist – it has merely adapted the way it operates. Al Qaeda is no longer just an organisation, it has become a franchise with new terrorist cells springing up all over the world. The cells are independent of each other, the destruction of one cell has no effect on the existence of another.45 Any of these cells could launch a terrorist attack – the planning and execution of the 9/11 attacks, which led to the death of 3000 people cost about $400,000- $500,00046 – a sum of

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Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. 317. "Foreign Policy." The White House. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . 45 Echevarria II, Antulio J. "Globalization and the Nature of War." The Strategic Studies Institute (2003): 2-39. Print. 14-17 46 National Comission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. "The Financing of the 9/11 Plot." 911commission.gov. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . 143 44

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money that could easily be acquired through private investors. This observation could lead to the conclusion that terrorist networks do not have centres of gravity, due to the lack of one central concentration of mass. Alternatively, one could conclude that terrorist organisations do have centres of gravity, they just have not been identified correctly. If one looks a chapter IV, book 8 of ‘On War’ where Clausewitz revists his concept of the ‘centre of gravity’ it becomes clear that the centre of gravity is not neccesarily a physical concentration of force: ‘In states torn by internal dimensions, this centre generally lies in the capital; in small states dependent on greater ones, it lies generally in the army of these allies: in a confederacy, it lies in the unity of interests; in a national insurrection, in the person of the chief leader, and in public opinion.’47 Now one might argue, that the islamist movement is an insurrection, Osama bin Laden was the leader and now he has been asassinated we can claim victory in the War on Terror. However, the islamist movement is no one man operation in which the ideology and its leader will die together – Al Qaeda and other islamist groups have developed a complex infrastracture and hierachy of leaders, where the death of one will not destroy the movement.48 Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II argues that Al-Qaeda’s centre of gravity is ideological, rather than physical: ‘Al-Qaeda’s centre of gravity might lie at its ideological core – its hatred of apostasy and its vision of a pan-Islamic empire – since that is what enables it to draw recruits and to support them.49 In order to create a ‘blow’ against this point of gravity an alternative ideology must be offered to Al Qaeda’s audience, one that is more rational and credible and satisfies the same self interest. At the moment Al Qaeda is able to generate support from the wider Muslim community by blaming the West for the disadvanted situation of the Middle East – the issues that concern the majority of Muslims need to be adressed in order to separate islamist extremism from the rest of the islamic world.50 Once this has been accomplished‘the blow must be persistently repeated in the same direction’. This process will take longer than just a few years, but if we endure ‘by seeking out

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Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. 351-352. "BBC News - Al-Qaeda's Remaining Leaders." BBC - Homepage. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. 49 Echevarria II, Antulio J. "Globalization and the Nature of War." 18. 50 Schweitzer, Joseph P. "Al Qaeda: Centre of Gravity and Decisive Points." US Army War College (2003): 2-32. Print.19 48

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constantly the heart of the hostile power (…) we can effectually strike the enemy to the ground.’ 51 Conclusion Is Clausewitzian thought timeless? I would think it is. That is not to say that war and its conduct is timeless. ‘In whatever way it [war] is conducted its conception remains unaltered (…) the conduct of war properly so called is, a use of prepared means adapted to the most special requirements, was not considered as any suitable subject for theory, but one which should be left to natural talents alone.’52 Even during the time Clausewitz served as a solider the conduct of war changed, therefore he was aware that the means with which people fought would not be the same as time went on. However, what makes Clausewitz and his theories on war timeless as in ‘not affected by the passage of time or changes in fashion’53 is the fact that he was concerned with the very nature of war - the logic of war. He himself says that its conception remains unaltered, and it does. Today, in the War on Terror, we fight by very different means, but Clausewitz’s arguably most important concepts of war, the ‘wondrous trinity’, the role of politics and policy, and the center of gravity can still be applied to the War on Terror.

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Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. 351-352. Ibid., 73-83. 53 "Oxford Dictionaries" Oxforddictionaries.com. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. 52

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Bibliography Print: Echevarria II, Antulio J. "Globalization and the Nature of War." The Strategic Studies Institute (2003): 2-39. Print. Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia UP, 2002. Print. Gurtov, Melvin. Superpower on Crusade: the Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006. Print. Heng, Y.-K. "Unravelling the `War' on Terrorism: A Risk-Management Exercise in War Clothing?" Security Dialogue 33.2 (2002): 227-42. Print. Kaldor, Mary. "Inconclusive Wars: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant in These Global Times?"Global Policy 1.3 (2010): 271-81. Print. Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby. "A New Kind of War: Strategic Culture and the War on Terrorism." IIS Working Paper 3 (2003): 2-21. Print. Rogers, Paul. Global Security and the War on Terror: Elite Power and the Illusion of Control. London: Routledge, 2008. Print. Schweitzer, Joseph P. "Al Qaeda: Centre of Gravity and Decisive Points." US Army War College (2003): 2-32. Print. Shephard, John JR. E. "On War: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant." US Army War College(1990): 85-99. Print. Stone, John. "Clausewitz's Trinity and Contemporary Conflict." Civil Wars 9.3 (2007): 282-96. Print. Van, Creveld Martin. The Transformation of War. New York: Free, 1991. Print. Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Ware: Wordsworth Classics, 1997. Print.

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Von Clausewitz, Carl. Vom Kriege. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1980. Print. Web: Newspapers: "Al-Qaeda Releases Video of French Hostages - Africa - Al Jazeera English." AJE – Al Jazeera English. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . "BBC News - Al-Qaeda's Remaining Leaders." BBC - Homepage. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . Mulvey, Stephen. "BBC News - Could Terrorists Get Hold of a Nuclear Bomb?" BBC News Home. Web. 19 Nov. 2011. "Obama Administration to End Use of Term 'war on Terror' | World News | Guardian.co.uk." Latest News, Sport and Comment from the Guardian | The Guardian. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . Yurdakul, Afsin. "He Told Bush That America Is under Attack." Msnbc.com Breaking News, Science and Tech News, World News, US News, Local NewsMsnbc.com. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . Natta, Don Van, and Lizette Alvarez. "A DAY OF TERROR - ATTACK ON MILITARY - A DAY OF TERROR - ATTACK ON MILITARY - A Hijacked Boeing 757 Slams Into the Pentagon, Halting the Government - NYTimes.com."The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. 12 Sept. 2001. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . Clarke, Richard A. "Bin Laden's Dead. Al Qaeda's Not." Nytimes.com. 2 May 2011. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. .

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Dictionaries & Encyclopaedias: Document: George W. Bush: Declaration of War on Terrorism -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia." Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . "Oxford Dictionaries" Oxforddictionaries.com. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. . Government Pages: "Foreign Policy." The White House. Web. .

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National Comission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. "The Financing of the 9/11 Plot." 9-11commission.gov. Web. 17 Nov. 2011. .

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