Security Issues in Modern Automotive Systems

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Security Issues in Modern Automotive Systems Patrick Nisch Computer Science and Media Stuttgart Media University (HdM) Email: [email protected]

Abstract—Today’s cars do not distinguish from each other just by their exterior or by their engine any more, but also by their technical features. The big car manufacturers recognized this trend and try to excel their competitors. Modern cars consist of dozens of digital computers and sensors to control and monitor the internal systems and increase the safety and convenience of the customers. On the other hand, these features introduce new potential risks. This paper provides an overview of current security issues and attack scenarios and aims to raise awareness of the increased surface for malicious attacks in the current and future generation of cars. This paper is based on the lecture ”Secure Systems” taught by Professor Walter Kriha at the Media University Stuttgart (HdM). November 24, 2011

I. I NTRODUCTION The technology in automotive car systems will be the next domain where we will be connected to the world. The new Mercedes-Benz F 125! research vehicle showed at this year’s IAA1 provides an outlook on the future of car infotainment. It shows how vehicles could look like in the year 2025 and beyond. The slogan of the Cloud-based infotainment system is “Always online, always connected”. The vision, as seen by Mercedes Benz, is described as the following: In the future, the driver will be able to start with the traffic report or retrieve personal messages before the selected music program begins. The weather report will then automatically come on before the journey ends, for example. Thanks to the mood-based configuration function ”Moods”, such individual adjustments will be completed in a matter of seconds in future. The F125! also opens up completely new dimensions when it comes to external communication and the use of social networks. With the help of the Social Community Assistant, the driver alone can decide who is allowed to ”disturb” him, or who receives information. [1] For the vision to become true, the car needs to satisfy mainly three requirements: First, the car needs to be highly instrumented. More and more embedded computer chips find their way in today’s 1 Internationale

Automobil Ausstellung in Frankfurt

modern cars. Embedded devices are used in almost every area of vehicles, including airbags, the radio, power seats, antilock braking system, cameras, autonomous cruise control and electronic stability control. Extra features of the last decade like air conditioning, heated seats and automatic gear are commonly standard today, and the prize for extras is now tagged on specialized embedded technologies like Bluetooth, GPS navigation system or in-vehicle-infotainment systems. The value of a car highly relies on its electronics. A recent estimate assumes that a typical premium car now contains 70100 independent electronic control units (ECUs) coordinating and monitoring components and sensors [2]. Secondly, it needs to become ”intelligent” in a way, that it accumulates data from different sensors and computer units to interpret whole situations and provide quick and fast reactions. This enfolds many areas of a car and will optimize fuel consumption to be more efficient, provide real time information about traffic and news, increase safety through accident prevention, improve convenience through recommendation systems for music etc. And finally, the car needs to be interconnected with different protocols, like Ethernet, WiFi, GSM, 3G, Bluetooth, radio, or even infrared, to communicate to all kinds of systems, devices, back-ends, etc. Also Internet-based services find their way in today’s cars. Mobile internet flatrates are getting affordable and reception coverage is spreading in rural areas as well. Additionally the introduction of Long Term Evolution (LTE) enhances this development and increases the up-and download speed considerably. The design, development and management of the embedded technology (including software, sensors, semiconductors, mechanical systems, etc) also adds a layer of complexity, cost and risk to modern cars. Embedded systems like these are physical and systematically close neighbours. Most vehicles implement multiple buses, each of which host a subset of the ECUs. Because many features like hand-free features and displaying messages on the console require complex interactions, these buses must be interconnected to support the complex coupling between pairs of ECUs. This complexity warrants attention to security. If one unit is compromised, the others are not far to reach [3]. A recently published analysis by computer security company McAfee warns that the large amount of chips in modern cars highly increases their attacking surface for hacks. The report further states that there were no malicious attacks

Lecture: Securce Systems on vehicles equipped with original factory’s components so far, yet mentions that a disgruntled former employee of a car dealership disabled 100 cars by manipulating an aftermarket security system that had been installed previously [4]. Whereas the embedded hardware is one critical aspect to be concerned of, the required software is another. The software needed for modern cars is extensive and can contain up to 100 million lines of code, increasing on a fast pace. Frost and Sullivan estimates that cars will require 200 million to 300 million lines of software code in the near future. For today’s cars the cost of software and electronics can reach up to 40% of the cost of a car already [2]. Also IBM is saying that “as software becomes the key ingredient in product innovation, traditional manufacturers are essentially becoming software companies!” [5].

Security Issues in Modern Automotive Systems

Fig. 1. OnStar MyLink displays information about the connected car such as oil and fuel status, average fuel economy, and mileage. In addition, the OnStar MyLink enables you to honk the vehicle’s horn, lock and unlock doors, and on some models, remotely start the car.

A. Related Work

A. MirrorLink

The Center for Automotive Embedded Systems Security (CAESS) is a collaboration between researchers at the University of California San Diego and the University of Washington. Their aim is to help to ensure the security, privacy, and safety of future automotive embedded systems. So far, two publications were released which are quoted throughout this paper. The first one was published in 2010 and aimed on analysing the internal resilience of a conventional automobile against a digital attack towards its internal components, presuming that the attacker has physical access to the car’s internal network. The paper concludes the internal networks in some modern cars are insecure and demonstrates the ability to adversarially control a wide range of automotive functions including disabling the brakes, selectively braking individual wheels on demand, stopping the engine, etc. [3]. Criticism was widely uttered for the unrealistic scenario of the attacker having physical access to the car’s internal network. Therefore a second paper was published in 2011. This time the focus lay on the analysis of the remote attack surface of modern cars. The paper provides an extensive overview of different threat models via indirect physical access(e.g. OBDII and audio files), short-range wireless access (e.g. Bluetooth), and long-range wireless access (e.g. Cellular). Their results are partly alarming and are presented in Section III [6].

MirrorLink3 provides in-vehicle mobile device adaptation for an interactive multi-modal experience using two-way communication between the vehicles in-dash display and applications running on the Smartphone. MirrorLink is the new name of the Terminal Mode 1.0.1 standard from the open Car Connectivity Consortium (CCC). CCC member companies4 represent many of the major automotive OEMs, mobile device manufacturers, and consumer electronics technology providers, only one larger consumer electronics provider refuses to take part in the CCC, naming Apple Inc. The goal is to improve the overall consumer experience when connecting mobile devices to in-vehicle infotainment systems. By using the car’s own controller the safety of the usage of mobile devices while driving increases. The incorporation with such broad industry support to develop an open standard makes sure that the technology will last for many years and other manufactures may join as well.

II. M ODERN CARS The automobile industry adds new features to increase customers convenience. The user experience we are used to have with our mobile devices like smartphones and tablets is expected to be available in cars as well. Therefore, car manufacturers put a lot of effort in developing similar HMIs2 for their in-car-entertainment systems. The problem is, that the developing time for new car models takes several years. The decision to determine which features to include and which to abandon needs to be finalized about two years before the roll-out. This circumstance makes it hard to follow the rapid developments of consumer electronics. Some developments to circumvent this barriers are described below: 2 Human

Machine Interface

B. Smartphone Applications The borders of a car are not just defined by its physical dimension only, but also by its wireless capacities. Many manufacturers offer cell phone-based communication, for instance, GM’s OnStar MyLink (Fig. 1), Ford’s SYNC, BMW’s Assist, Lexus’ Enform, Toyota’s Safety Connect, and Mercedes’ mbrace. The possibilities of these mobile apps include: • Sending navigation data from any destination • Unlocking the car with an unique remote key, identifying the passenger and adjusting the preferred seat and mirror positions • Remotely slow down of stolen cars, block the ignition and obtain exact coordinates of the cars location • Starting the car and set charging times remotely via smartphones for plug-ins like the Chevy Volt • Fords MyKey allows specially programmed functions such as limiting the maximum speed or depending on the 3 http://www.terminalmode.org/ 4 Charter members are: Alpine, Daimler, General Motors, Honda, HTC, Hyundai Motor Company, LG Electronics, Nokia, Panasonic, PSA, Samsung, Toyota, Volkswagen

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Security Issues in Modern Automotive Systems

key used, the radio will remain silent if the passengers are unbelted Automated emergency calls after heavy accidents (if the airbags got inflated)

Some car makers also include in-car WiFi hot spots in their vehicles that provide Internet access for all the passengers’ devices. Internet As described in the introduction the cars are the next big environment that will be conquered by the Internet. C. Third-Party Applications Another way to keep pace with the development of consumer electronics is to open the infotainment system for thirdparty applications. The question to open the system is not easy to answer especially concerning security aspects. It must be prevented that malicious software finds it way into the cars system. Also the car manufacturers have big interest in applications that do not influence the brands customer experience, so applications must achieve a certain amount of quality and must not distract the driver. So far, most of the available third-party applications are the big players like Twitter and Pandora, and they are often tightly integrated in the surrounding system. One way to enable third-party application for the car manufactures is to provide an SDK for developers and strictly review submissions before approval. III. S ECURITY I SSUES In this section seven different areas will be considered and examined for security issues or vulnerabilities: A. TPMS (Tire Pressure Monitoring System) In the USA systems for monitoring the pressure in tires are obligatory since 2008. From 2012 on they shall be obligatory in Europe as well. Scientists from University of South Carolina and Rutgers University in Piscataway found out that this system can be used to manipulate the ECU of a vehicle [7]. The TPMS consists of a sensor, a transmitter (sending at 125hHz) and an antenna (receiving at 433MHz) located in the wheel case or in the wheel itself (Figure 2). The sensor measures the pressure and sends the information periodically to the ECU. But the communication is not secured, the data protocol is neither encrypted nor signed. Security Issue I: Due to not authenticated messages and no use of input validation in the vehicles ECU, the scientists were able to inject spoofed messages and repeatedly turned the low tire pressure warning lights of the vehicle on and off. Obviously the driver thinks the tire has too little pressure and drives to the next service station to fill it up again.

Fig. 2.

Overview of a TPMS system used in the VW Phanteon [8].

Security Issue II: Every tire sensor has its own unique 32-Bit identification which is send in every package. Triggering sensor transmissions is possible from roadside stations through an activation signal. The messages can be interrupted up to 40 meters from a passing car. Therefore widely spread foreign receivers can recognize cars and could create a detailed moving profile of the car, without anyone being aware of it. Tracking vehicles was possible before through visible license plate identification, but tracking through TPMS identifiers is a low cost solution and harder to deactivate than other wireless car components. The scientists recommend applying standard reliable software design practices and basic cryptographic security mechanisms to prevent the security issues. B. GPS (Global Positioning System) The Global Positioning System is a space-based global navigation satellite system (GNSS) that provides location and time information anywhere on the Earth, where there is an unobstructed line of sight to four or more GPS satellites. The GPS project was developed in 1973 to overcome the limitations of previous navigation systems and was officially released on 17. July 1995. Subsequently, it was made fully available to civilians in 2007. Although GPS includes security features for encryption, they are only used for military purposes, the signals for civilians are transmitted in the clear. A GPS receiver calculates its position by precisely timing the signals sent by GPS satellites high above the Earth. Each satellite continually transmits messages including the time of transmitting and precise orbital information. The receiver uses the messages it receives to determine the transit time of each message and computes the distance to each satellite. These distances combined with the satellites’ locations are used to compute the position of the receiver [9]. The main purpose of GPS is navigation, but today it is also used for an ever-broadening list of applications, including management of the power grid and tracking criminals under house arrest. The reliability of the received GPS information is seen as ground truth and can have large jurisdictional 3

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Security Issues in Modern Automotive Systems

impact: it might be tax law-related in use of electronic drivers’ logbooks, labour law-related in use for Fleet Tracking and the information recorded in black boxes is permitted as evidence in case of accidents. Security Issue III: Researchers at Cornell University demonstrated that the system can be spoofed to produce erroneous readings. Therefore a briefcase-size GPS receiver was programmed (originally used in ionospheric research) to send out fake signals. The receiver then can be placed in the proximity of a navigation device, where it can track, modify, and retransmit the signals being transmitted from the GPS satellite network. The fake GPS signals will be accept as authentic ones. [10] The issue of GPS receiver spoofing is already known for years. Yet in 2003 an article from Los Alamos National Laboratory addressed the vulnerability describing seven ”countermeasures” to recognize suspicious activity [11]. But, according to the Cornell researchers, such countermeasures would not have successfully guarded against the signals produced by their reprogrammed receiver.

Fig. 3.

Relay attack using a paired set of radio devices.

KeeLoq; a remote keyless entry system used for access control purposes such as garage openers or car door systems. As shown in Figure 4 the key calculates a hash out of a starting value and a secret key. The hash value is transmitted and becomes the new starting value for the next hash. The car calculates the future 5 hash values for every correct received hash. If many hash values can not be received correctly, the car must be opened mechanically. When the key is in the ignition lock it gets reloaded and resynchronized.

C. Keyless Entry Systems Car entry systems use RFID technology to gain remotely access to the cars. Therefore the car emits beacons periodically on the low frequency channel (120 to 135 KHz). When the key is in range, it wakes up, demodulates the signals and interprets them. Then a response to that challenge is computed and replied on the ultra high frequency channel (315 or 433 MHz). If the response is valid, the car unlocks the doors. To start the engine the key must be inside the car and must reply to different types of messages. Security Issue IV: In February this year a paper was published about relay attacks on passive keyless entry in modern cars. Three researchers from ETH Z¨urich were able to break into 10 vehicles made by 8 different manufacturers and drive away. To do so, it is necessary to intercept and relay the radio signals from the smart keys to the cars. Although the concept of relay attacks is not new, it is the first time of a very practical realization of the theory. In fact, the costs for the needed material are just about 100 Dollar. For relay attacks a paired set of radio devices is needed. One device is located next to the car and the other one next to the key as shown in Figure 3. The devices intercept the radio signals emitted by the car and the responses from the key and extends those signals so that the key and the car believe they are in authorized range. Without breaking any cryptography the captured signal can then be used to enter the vehicle and start the engine, bypassing any further security systems. [12] Another way of getting access to a keyless car system was shown by researchers at Ruhr University Bochum. The paper presents the first successful differential power analysis attack on numerous commercial products using

Fig. 4.

Calculating key with KeeLoq algorithm.

Security Issue V: The researchers succeeded in keycloning by eavesdropping only two messages from distance. Combining side-channel cryptanalysis with specific properties of the proprietary KeeLoq algorithm allows efficient revealing of the secret key of a remote transmitter and the manufacturer key stored in a receiver. In addition, a denial of service attack for KeeLoq systems is introduced, whereby the owner of the original transmitter needs to press the button 215 times to produce a valid code message, leaving the impression for the device to be out of service. D. On-Board Diagnostics (OBD-II) In all modern cars in the United States an On-Board Diagnostics port can be found under the dash providing direct and standard access to internal automotive networks. This interface provides direct access to the vehicle’s CAN5 buses. The OBD-II port is accessed by service personnel during routine maintenance to diagnose and update individual ECUs. In modern cars the connection is established by specific diagnostics hardware devices via USB or WiFi and the ODP-II port (all new cars in the U.S. support the SAE J2534 “PassThru” standard - a Windows API that provides a standard, programmatic interface to communicate with a car’s internal buses). Once connected, software on the computer can eavesdrop or program the car’s ECUs. The communication is 5 Controller

Area Network

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Security Issues in Modern Automotive Systems

unauthenticated. The researches from CAESS show that an attacker connected to this internal network can circumvent all computer control systems, including safety-critical elements such as the brakes and engine. Figure 5 shows such an exploit with the CarShark tool a custom CAN bus analyser and packet injection tool. [6] Security Issue V: If an attacker manages to connect to the same WiFi network as the diagnostics device, it is also possible to connect to the device itself. As soon as the device is connected to a car, the attacker has the same connection and is able to gain control over the car’s re-programming. Security Issue VI: It is also possible to compromise the diagnostic device itself. At the beginning of the communication, the device multicasts a UDP packet on the network. For receiving client requests the device sends its IP address and TCP port. The client then connects to the port and uses the PathThru DLL to configure it and to start communication to the vehicle. The communication itself is unauthenticated and only relies on the external network security for any access control. The only limitation is, that only one connection at a time is allowed to the device, and thus the attacker needs to wait for an unused connection. The device then exports a proprietary, unauthenticated API for configuring its network state. Input validation bugs in the implementation of this protocol allow an attacker to run commands via shell-injection. By implanting malicious code, every further connected car under service gets affected. [6] E. Audio System Since long time CD-players are shipped in virtually all cars. The later ones provide, next to an MP3-capable CD-player, also some digital ports, e.g. USB or iPod docking port, to allow the customers to use their usual audio player in the car infotainment system as well. The researchers examined the firmware for input vulnerabilities and were able to exploit the system. [6] Security Issue VII: By adding code to a digital music file (CD or MP3 file), it can be turned into a Trojan horse. Input vulnerabilities of the media player’s firmware then allow the execution of arbitrary code. The researchers demonstrated an attack by modifying and WMA audio file. Played on a car’s media player the file sends arbitrary CAN packets to compromise the car systems, whereas played on a PC the file runs normally. Mass distribution of such modified files over peer-to-peer networks would be quite easy, with devastating consequences. [6] The threat of a compromised media system alone is limited, but, as described previously, today the internal network connection of media components are also linked to the CAN bus to enable cross system functionality. If only one bus is compromised it is possible to gain access to components of another [3].

Fig. 5. CarShark exploid by the CAESS researchers. The car displays arbitrary messages and false speedometer readings. (Note that the car was in parking mode). [3]

F. Bluetooth Another common feature in head units of modern cars is the use of Bluetooth devices such as mobile phones to enable hands-free calling. To use a Bluetooth device with the car system it is necessary to pair the devices. Therefore the car provides a random PIN, which must then be entered manually in the external Bluetooth device. In the examined car, the researchers from CAESS, identified the responsible program for the Bluetooth functionality. Whereas the used Bluetooth protocol is a widely used implementation, the interface and the rest of the application is custom-build. In the custom-build part of the software code the researchers found unsafe strcpy vulnerabilities which are easily exploitable. [6] Security Issue VIII: While direct access to the cars’ Bluetooth system might be difficult, the researchers showed a way to attack the system indirectly. So, the first step is to compromise the mobile phone of the customer. An implemented Trojan horse for the Android platform checks the phone for connected Bluetooth devices; if it recognizes the other party as a head unit, it sends the attack code. Applications hiding a Trojan horse on Android Market have been found before [13]. Security Issue IX: For a direct attack to a Bluetooth device two steps are necessary. First, the MAC address of the device must be gathered. To do so, the researchers showed two ways to get the required information. With the help of the open source Bluesniff package and a USRP-based software radio it is possible to sniff the MAC address when the car is started in presence of a previously paired device. Another way to capture the MAC address is by sniffing and analysing Bluetooth traffic of devices, which were previously paired with the car and are still enabled. Once the MAC is known, the next step is to get around the random PIN. Therefore the researchers used a simple laptop to issue brute force pairing request. They were successful with an average of approximately 10 hours per car. Because the attack needs such a long time and requires the car to be running, it is also 5

Lecture: Securce Systems possible to parallelize it to sniff MAC addresses of multiple cars at the same time. If a thousand of such cars leave a parking garage at the end of a day, they expect to brute force the PIN of at least one car within a minute. When the pairing to the car’s Bluetooth device succeeded, the car can be compromised in the same way as shown above. [6] G. Cellular As described above the cellular capabilities in car’s telematics units increase safety and convenience features in modern cars. But these features also increase the attack surface. Through a cell phone interface the head unit is able to use 3G for Internet connections and the voice channel for safety functions (e.g. crash notifications). In most sedans in North America the transformation from analogue to digital is synthesized with Airbiquity’s aqLink software modem. To switch the call into data mode an in-band, tone-based signalling protocol is used. In the paper from CAESS, the researchers examined and reverse engineered the aqLink protocol and the overlaying command protocol (information about the state of the car) to build an aqLink-compatible software modem to find vulnerabilities [6]. Authentication process: When calling a car (the phone number is available via caller ID) in data mode, the car sends a message with a random, three byte authentication challenge packet. The Telematics Call Center (TCC), operated by the manufacturer, generates a response by hashing the challenge along with a 64-bit pre-shared key. If an incorrect authentication response is received, or a response is not received within the prescribed time limit, the Command program will send an error packet. Security Issue X: The authentication process is flawed because the ‘random’ number generator is re-initialized whenever the telematics unit starts. An attacker can sniff the cellular link during a TCC-initiated call and observe the response packet. He can then authenticate himself as the TCC whenever the telematics unit is turned on. Security Issue XI: Another grave bug in the process was found by the researchers, which allows authentication without sniffing the challenge at all. For approximately one out of 256 challenges the incorrect responses will be accepted as valid. As long as the telematics unit is not shut down, the authentication test can be bypassed and the exploit can be transmitted. [6] IV. C ONCLUSION Cars are getting highly computerized and connected. But together with new features new risks come along. The importance of the security aspect increases as new features (see section II. Modern Cars) will get access to the incar infotainment systems in the years to come. With the obtained entrance of the Internet in modern cars, they could

Security Issues in Modern Automotive Systems be vulnerable to hackers just as normal computers are today. [14] Most of the presented security issues do only exist due to a lack of properly implemented security features. Therefore, the referenced papers for each issue provide recommendations for security mechanisms that can alleviate most security and privacy concerns described in this paper. Thus the car manufacturers are encouraged to watch conscientiously on their interfaces to the internal systems. The CAESS researchers say, that the modern car industry put extensive effort in designing safely tolerant components, but did not take intentionally attacks of hackers into account who want to take over the system [3]. The goal must be to reduce the attack surface as much as possible. The loss of reputation for a possible security scandal or a broad product callback would be multiple times more expensive than to put more effort in diligent implementations. R EFERENCES [1] Mercedes Benz Homepage, Online: http://media.daimler.com/dcmedia/0921-1417474-1-1422637-1-0-1-1422684-0-1-11694-614226-0-1-0-0-0-00.html?TS=1317216008611 [2] Robert N. Charette, “This Car Runs on Code”, Online: http://spectrum.ieee.org/green-tech/advanced-cars/this-car-runs-on-code, February 2009. [3] K. Koscher, A. Czeskis, F. Roesner, S. Patel, T. Kohno, S. Checkoway, D. McCoy, B. Kantor, D. Anderson, H. Shacham, and S. Savage, “Experimental security analysis of a modern automobile”, at IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer Society, Online: http://www.autosec.org/publications.html, 2010. [4] McAfee, Report: “Caution: Malware Ahead”, Online: http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-caution-malwareahead.pdf, 2011. [5] Scott Hebner , White Paper: “Smarter Products - The Building Blocks for a Smarter Planet”, 2009. [6] K. Koscher, A. Czeskis, F. Roesner, S. Patel, T. Kohno, S. Checkoway, D. McCoy, B. Kantor, D. Anderson, H. Shacham, and S. Savage, “Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces”, at IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Online: http://www.autosec.org/publications.html, 2011. [7] Ishtiaq Rouf, Rob Miller, Hossen Mustafa, Travis Taylor, Sangho Oh, Wenyuan Xu, Marco Gruteser, Wade Trappe, Ivan, “Security and Privacy Vulnerabilities of In-Car Wireless Networks: A Tire Pressure Monitoring System Case Study”, at USENIX, 2010. [8] Online: http://forums.vwvortex.com/showthread.php?1817987-TirePressure-Monitoring-System[9] Global Postitioning System on Wikipedia, Online: http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Global Positioning System, 2011. [10] Todd E. Humphreys, Brent M. Ledvina, Mark L. Psiaki, Brady W. O’Hanlon, and Paul M. Kintner, Jr., “Assessing the Spoong Threat: Development of a Portable GPS Civilian Spoofer”, at GNSS Conference Savanna, 2008. [11] Jon S. Warner, Roger G. Johnston, Homelandsecurity: “GPS Spoofing Countermeasures”, at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Online: http://www.homelandsecurity.org/bulletin/Dual%20Benefit/warner gps spoofing.html, 2003. [12] Aurlien Francillon, Boris Danev, Srdjan Capkun, “Relay Attacks on Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Cars”, at 18th Annual Network And Distributed System Security Symposium, 2011, ETH Z¨urich. [13] J. Vijayan, “Update: Android gaming app hides Trojan, security vendors warn”, at Computerworld, Online: http://www.computerworld.com/s/ article/9180844/Update Android gaming app hides Trojan security vendors warn, 2010. [14] J. Markoff, “Cars’ Computer Systems Called at Risk to Hackers”, Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/science/14hack.html, 2010.

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